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Introduction
Until the 1950s, Spain enjoyed relatively little of  the sustained, often rap-
id economic growth that had become typical of  most of  Western Europe by 
the mid-19th century. Economic historians have offered several explanations 
for this stagnation, many of  them centered on a set of  economic institutions 
that inhibited growth.2 This paper examines a specific version of  that institu-
tional view.3 We study the relationship between company law and the organi-
zation of  multi-owner firms, first by tracing the evolution of  organizational 
law in Spain from 1886 to 1936, and then by using two different empirical 
sources to study the way the different organizational forms were used by 
1. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Fundación Séneca-Agencia Re-
gional de Ciencia y Tecnología de la Región de Murcia (Project 15147/PHCS/10); Spanish Min-
istry of Economy and Competitiveness (Project HAR2013-42013-R); the Program in Economic 
History of the Economic Growth Center, Yale University; the National Science Foundation; and 
the Fundación Esteban Romero. We appreciate advice from Salvador Almenar, Anna Aubanell, 
Luis Bértola, Paloma Fernández, Domingo Gallego, Leslie Hannah, Jochen Streb, and Carles 
Sudriá. We also received helpful suggestions from the IX Curso de Análisis Económico del Dere-
cho workshop, Harvard Law School-Fundación Rafael del Pino, October 2012; III Encuentro 
Asociación Española de Historia Económica, September 2012; and the 9th European Social Sci-
ence History Conference, April 2012. Adèle Rossouw and Anna Demaree provided excellent re-
search assistance. This paper is related to Guinnane’s research with Harris, Lamoreaux and 
Rosenthal (see references) and we thank them for discussions. Please address correspondence to 
Guinnane: timothy.guinnane@yale.edu
2. Malo de Molina, Martín-Aceña (2011); Bernecker (2009); Valdaliso (2002); Tortella, 
García Ruiz, Ortiz Villajos, Quiroga (2008), among others.
3. De la Torre and García-Zúñiga (2013) study the specific statutory scheme of  foral vs. 
Spanish law.
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Spanish business. The period we study also coincides with the development 
of  a new enterprise form in Germany, Britain, and other European countries. 
This form, which combined aspects of  the corporate and partnership forms, 
came to dominate new firm registrations wherever it was introduced. Guin-
nane et al adopt the term Private Limited-Liability Company (hereafter PLLC) 
as a general rubric for enterprise forms such as the British Private Limited 
Company (hereafter PLC), the German Gesellschaftmitbeschränkter Haftung 
(hereafter GmbH) and the French Société à Responsabilité Limitée (hereafter 
SARL).4 The PLLC appeared in Spain as Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limi-
tada (hereafter SRL). While the specific rules for these forms differs from 
country to country, all have some attributes of  corporations and some at-
tributes of  partnerships, and thus represent an intermediate form. The Span-
ish SRL was created in a different way, as we demonstrate, but bears impor-
tant similarities to the other PLLC forms. We end our study in 1936 because 
of  the Spanish Civil War.
Recent research in the law and economics literature stresses the impor-
tance of  flexibility for virtually all areas of  economic life: flexibility permits 
agents to tailor their activities more precisely to particular situations, allow-
ing them to avoid transactions and other costs that come with rigid law. On 
this dimension, Spanish company law scored very well. We define flexibility 
in two ways. The first pertains to the freedom to make contracts among the 
founders and owners of  firms. In the United States for example, the law gov-
erning corporations in the late 19th century was quite prescriptive. Entrepre-
neurs setting up new firms with this form had little choice in many key mat-
ters. British law, on the other hand, afforded great flexibility to organizers of 
corporations.5 Spanish company law was more like the British, that is, more 
contractual, but Spanish law was more flexible in a second way: the menu of 
legal forms was open, unlike the situation in most civil-law countries. “Typi-
cality” is a general idea thought by Spanish legal experts to be necessary for 
legal certainty.6 Applied to company law, typicality implies a fixed and defined 
set of  choices for the legal form of enterprise — that is, the so-called princi-
ple of  numerus clausus. Most civil-law countries relied on numerus clausus 
then and now to limit new firms to one of  a small set of  forms set out in the 
code. For example, the French commercial code of 1807 (§19) recognizes three 
company forms: the ordinary and limited partnerships, and the corporation. 
Spanish business law, on the other hand, had the opposite principle, that of 
numerus apertus. The Spanish business code of  1885 (§122) recognized the 
4. Guinnane et al (2007).
5. Harris and Lamoreaux (2010).
6. Spanish scholars treat the notion of  typicality as a basic legal principle, and often 
trace the idea’s influence to the German penal theorist Ernst Beling. See Casado Burdano 
(2000), p. 1053.
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same three forms as the French “as a general rule.” Spanish firms were explic-
itly free to create any form they wanted, so long as no feature of  that form 
was illegal under some provision in the business code.
The Spanish example poses a serious challenge to the idea of  legal devel-
opment that underlies what is probably the dominant view of the relationship 
between law and company formation and operation. This civil-law vs. com-
mon-law distinction lies at the heart of  an influential literature. La Porta et 
al. (hereafter LLSV) pioneered the so-called “law and finance” literature, which 
argues that countries with a civil-law legal tradition tend to do worse in foster-
ing a climate that leads to investment, and more generally in economic growth.7 
These authors find that common-law countries enjoy better protection for cor-
porate investors and other features associated with better capital markets. Their 
argument echoes a long tradition that emphasizes the ability of common-law 
judges to devise sensible solutions to new problems.8 The civil-law reliance on 
statutory changes involves too much time or is too easily hijacked by special in-
terests to produce necessary outcomes, according to LLSV. The circumstances 
of the SRL’s birth were exceptional and appear to violate one of the central dif-
ferences between civil-law and common-law legal systems. 
The law and finance approach has generated enormous discussion, much 
of  it focused on the law relevant to large public companies, and little of  it fo-
cused on long-run historical development. (The latter fact is rather curious, 
given that LLSV view their argument as grounded in history.) LLSV and their 
followers rely heavily on coding legal rules on a national basis, and then us-
ing those rules as part of  a cross-country regression strategy. Things look dif-
ferent when one examines particular countries in more depth. Lamoreaux and 
Rosenthal show that the common-law can also produce conservatism: if  judg-
es are uneasy with a legal innovation introduced by the parliament, the judg-
es can construe it so narrowly as to make the innovation useless as a real re-
form.9 Guinnane et al provide an example of  this conservatism that accounts 
for the fact that the United States did not have a PLLC form until well after 
World War II.10
Spanish law was more flexible, in both of  our senses, than is supposed to 
be the case in civil-law countries. As noted, corporate law allowed a wide va-
riety of  approaches. This flexibility was enhanced by the notarial practice of 
enabling firms to adopt practices that were, if  not clearly illegal, at least du-
bious.11 The most flagrant cases involve corporations. Spanish corporations 
 7. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2008).
 8. Priest (1977) and Rubin (1977).
 9. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005).
10. See Guinnane et al (2007), pp. 715-719.
11. For example, there are cases of  limited partnerships where limited partners are listed 
as managers. This practice violates an organizing principle of  the limited partnership. (See Li-
15526_RHI_56_tripa.indd   83 31/10/14   15:12
Flexibility in Spanish Company Law, 1885-1936
84
did not have to have a minimum capital or number of owners, and the rules 
concerning the management committee (Junta de Gobierno or Junta de Admin-
istración) were modest. There were also no rules on minimum paid-in capital 
or reserves, or even stipulations detailing the requirements for reserves until 
the 1940s.12 But Spanish corporations pushed further. By the end of the 19th 
century, we see corporations that entrench a majority shareholder as the firm’s 
de facto dictator, and even give the firm a name that alludes to the majority 
shareholder, which, while not explicitly forbidden, was frowned-upon.13 Nam-
ing someone as president for life would be allowed in some jurisdictions and 
not in others; the Spanish code is silent on this practice. Only in 1951 did Spain 
adopt corporation legislation that sought to regulate corporate behavior.
The SRL’s creation is harder to pinpoint, as it was not at first written into 
any code. The Commercial Register for Spain announced in 1919 that it would 
approve registration of  SRLs.14 Entry in the Commercial Register is funda-
mental, as it gives the firm legal existence (§119 of the Spanish Business Code, 
1885). Thus from1919, the SRL was a fact, even if  the SRL did not appear in 
any legislation until 1953. The SRL’s creation reflects the second aspect of 
flexibility, the lack of numerus clausus. Spanish firms could create their “own” 
legal form, and, starting in 1919, many of  them did. We suspect, but cannot 
at this point document, that the Commercial Register’s 1919 rules reflect pres-
sure from notaries and their clients, who wanted forms organized as was pos-
sible in Germany or the United Kingdom, and were already using the flexi-
bility of  Spanish law to do so. We do know that some existed as early as 1916, 
which suggests that some notaries had convinced local registries to accept 
firms organized in this way.15
How did firms use all this flexibility? In this paper we focus on describing 
the choice of  enterprise form and how that changed over time, especially af-
ter the SRL’s appearance. Ideally, we would prefer a nominative listing of  all 
firms active in a given year or series of  years. Unfortunately, no such source 
exists for the period we study. As a substitute, we focus on the registration of 
new companies as reported by the Dirección General de los Registros y el No-
tariado (General Directorate of  Registries and Notaries). Databases drawn 
bros de Inscripciones del Registro Mercantil de Murcia, sheet n. 1045). Benito (1904 [1924]), I, 
pp. 469-470 complained about the acceptance of  this practice, noting that it allowed firms to 
take advantage of  a PLLC-like form in a way contrary to Spanish law.
12. Boletín Oficial del Estado (1942a, 1942b, 1947, 1951).
13. The corporation “Cros, SA”, founded by Amadeo Cros, illustrates the practice. Some 
authorities —for instance, Benito (1904 [1924]), I, pp. 470-471— considered a corporation na-
med after an owner an abuse.
14. The regulation of the commerce register was published in: Gaceta de Madrid (1919a), 
pp. 1018-1025; (1919b), pp. 1038-1043; (1919c), pp. 1059-1070.
15. Pelegrí (1918), p. 339 notes that in 1916, the commercial registry of  Barcelona accep-
ted three firms organized as SRLs, including one that had no capital.
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from this source allow us to document both the choice of  legal form and how 
it changed over the period 1886-1936.16 For a more limited period, we have 
firm-level data that allows us to examine the characteristics of  firms adopt-
ing different forms. Scholars have previously used this source to study com-
pany investment.17 Tafunell’s revisions to the original statistics include both 
national and provincial estimates, and attempt to correct some apparent in-
consistencies in the original.18
Our discussion is divided into three parts. We first explain how the menu 
of permitted forms affects the decisions entrepreneurs make in setting up mul-
ti-owner firms. We then turn to a brief  account of  Spanish commercial law, 
focusing on the treatment of  companies and enterprise form. Finally, we use 
two empirical sources to study the way Spanish firms used these choices. This 
paper is part of  a larger project on the development of  company law in Spain 
during the 19th and 20th centuries. Here we focus on legal rules and the basics 
patterns of choice of enterprise form. In other work in progress, we use econo-
metric modeling approaches to dig into the determinants of  legal form, using 
sources related to those exploited in the present paper. 
Why enterprise form matters
The legal form of enterprise frames the way investors in multi-owner firms 
combine their assets and efforts to create new companies and new invest-
ments, thus promoting economic growth. Firms face two central contracting 
issues: the problem of untimely dissolution and the problem of minority op-
pression.19 Untimely dissolution refers to a situation where a firm has sunk 
investments that may not yield their potential if  the firm dissolves before orig-
inally contemplated. Because a partnership ordinarily ended with the death 
of  any owner, simple mortality created problems for those seeking to use the 
partnership form for investments of  this type. More importantly, capital in-
vested in a partnership was not locked in; an investor could threaten to with-
draw and thus provoke the firm’s end as a way to secure a greater share of  the 
16. We describe the source in detail in the Appendix.
17. Jiménez Araya’s (1974) seminal paper studies capital formation and investment fluc-
tuations. The same source has been used to study other issues, including business cycles and 
business expectations. Martínez, Reig y Soler (1977), on the business cycle in the region of  Va-
lencia; Vázquez (1980), on Asturias; and German (1980), on Aragon, among others. More re-
cently Tafunell’s (2005) database has been used to create enterpreneurships indices (Valdaliso 
(2005), García Ruiz (2008), García Ruiz and Pérez Amaral (2011) and De la Torre and Gar-
cía- Zúñiga (2013), among others.
18. Tafunell (2005), pp.710 ff.
19. Throughout, we discuss multi-owner firms only, since our focus is on contracting 
problems. We acknowledge that multi-owner firms were a minority of  all businesses.
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firm’s profits, then the enterprise might be unworkable from the start. Minor-
ity oppression arises when one group of  investors cannot prevent others from 
engaging in actions with private benefits that at the same time reduce the val-
ue of  the shares owned by the minority. The oppressor can be other investors, 
the firm’s management, or both.
Partnerships, because they are essentially contracts between two or more 
people, are always vulnerable to untimely dissolution. On the other hand, 
they face relatively little minority oppression, because partners are free to 
contract on key matters such as the right to make decisions. The option of 
the limited partnership allows some investors to limit their liability in return 
from surrendering the right to participate in the firm’s management. Cor-
porations represent the opposite extreme. Investments in corporations are 
locked-in; owners can only withdraw by selling their shares to someone else. 
On the other hand, corporations are especially vulnerable to minority op-
pression. Their concentrated management allows those running the firm to 
abuse their insider status against all owners, and, depending on the voting 
rules associated with shares, majority owners can shape firm policy to suit 
private ends.
The introduction of  PLLC forms added considerable flexibility to the op-
tions facing entrepreneurs who wished to form a multi-owner firm. Until the 
late 19th century, in countries other than Spain, firms had to select from one 
or the other extreme of this tradeoff. Only with the introduction of more flex-
ible limited-liability forms could all investors enjoy limited liability and also 
contract flexibly to achieve the structure that most suited their firm. The Ger-
man GmbH represents the first clear case of  this intermediate form. Its inves-
tors enjoyed limited liability and transferable equity, but the articles of  asso-
ciation could shape governance in ways that a corporation could not. The 
firm could also limit share transfers to protect current owners from takeovers 
by investors hostile to their interests. The Spanish situation was different even 
before the SRL’s advent. Just how different depends in part on the compara-
tor; in France, for example, the corporate form was relatively flexible, while 
Germany’s corporation was unusually rigid and expensive after the reform of 
1884. Most U.S. states also insisted on specific governance practices.20 Prior 
to1919, Spanish firms chose between corporations and partnerships (ordinary 
and limited). And, just as elsewhere, the Spanish version of  the PLLC, SRL, 
allowed firms to manage the trade-off  between untimely dissolution and mi-
nority oppression more precisely. On the other hand, because Spanish corpo-
rations enjoyed a great deal of  flexibility, the SRL mattered (as we show em-
pirically) and represented a less dramatic change in the trade-off  than was the 
case with the introduction of  the German GmbH.
20. See Guinnane et al (2007), pp. 698-699 and pp. 714-723.
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Lack of  flexibility implies that some firms could not tailor their organi-
zation to suit the needs of  their technology, potential investors, or both. Two 
examples convey the flavor of  the problems. Suppose a small firm operates a 
technology that implies considerable sunk cost. As a partnership, this firm al-
ways faces the problem of untimely dissolution and the sunk cost may not be 
made, at least to the degree optimal. The inability to lock-in capital on a small 
scale (in the absence of  the SRL or something like it) implies that certain in-
vestments will not be made, to the detriment of  economic development over-
all. Now consider the investor’s perspective. Prior to the SRL, an investor who 
wanted limited liability had to invest either in a corporation (and face oppres-
sion by the majority) or as a limited partner (where by law the investor could 
have no voice in management issues). The PLLC form allows the investor to 
demand contractual arrangements that suit their situation and concerns, and 
thus makes it easier for firms to amass such investments.21
The legal framework
Spain’s first Commercial Code (1829) displays strong French influence, 
although it also followed the tradition of  Spanish commercial law as con-
tained in the Ordinance of  Bilbao (1737) and the Castilian Acts.22 The Span-
ish code differed from its French model in several ways. The 1829 code’s pro-
visions for corporations were especially advanced: it embodied the principle 
of  general incorporation (§ 293, § 294). Any group of  investors who met the 
criteria enumerated in the code could form a corporation, subject only to the 
principle of  publicity. Several U.S. states had adopted general incorporation 
prior to 1829, but elsewhere, every corporation required a specific and idio-
syncratic grant from the state. Britain, the industrial pioneer, did not adopt 
general incorporation until 1844, and general incorporation did not come to 
France and most Germany states until the late 1860s.23 The 1829 code did lead 
to the creation of  some corporations, but the historical circumstances at the 
time were not favorable to this form’s growth. The South American wars of 
independence led to repatriation of  capital and might have been one stimulus 
to incorporation, but Spain remained locked in dynastic and civil war until 
21. Hansmann, Kraakmann and Squier (2007) argue that limited liability requires ac-
counting innovations and monitoring technology that permit creditors to verify a firm’s assets.
22. Prior to the modern codes that begin in1829, there was an attempt to compile all 
Spanish law, referred to as the Novísima Recopilación (1805-1829 [1975]). A substantial part of 
those acts come from the Kingdom of Castile, before the unification of  Spain as a modern 
country. See Nuevas Ordenanzas de Bilbao, approved by the Castilian Council in December 2, 
1737. Martínez-Rodríguez (2013).
23. For an overview of the development of  company law in Britain, France, Germany 
and the United States, see Guinnane et al (2007).
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1840, and general incorporation was repealed in 1847, largely because of  a 
series of  scandals involving the Madrid stock market.24 Spain also lacked im-
portant complementary economic infrastructure (such as banks).25 During the 
following decade, several laws were passed allowing the creation of  corpora-
tions in specific sectors, including banking, mining and railways.26
The 1866 international economic crisis led to another collapse in the 
Spanish stock market. The real economy also suffered, with a halt to railway 
construction and a contraction of  Catalonia’s textile industry. The econom-
ic crisis provoked a military uprising that ended the monarchy and ushered 
in the first Spanish republic (1868). The new government tried to promote 
economic and social modernization. A new law once again granted general 
incorporation.27 The government also started drafting a new business law, 
which the restored monarchy eventually approved as the 1885 Commercial 
Code. The 1885 code made few changes to the 1829 code’s treatment of  busi-
ness firms, but it introduced one modification that proved critical to later de-
velopments. The 1829 code held to the principle of  numerus clausus in the 
menu of enterprise forms.28 The 1885 code (§117), on the other hand, pro-
claims the principle of  numerus apertus. The 1885 code also moved strongly 
in the direction of the “modern” corporation, with minimal prescriptions on 
the articles of association. This development promoted the creation of corpo-
rations that were ordinary business firms; previously, an important justification 
for a firm taking the corporate form was that its mission had a public-service 
aspect. Not until 1951 did Spanish law provide more specific requirements for 
corporations.29
The SRL
Thus, by 1885, Spanish firms clearly enjoyed both aspects of  flexibility. 
The commercial code’s numerus apertus feature was central to the SRL’s crea-
tion. The Spanish version of  the PLLC was not in any sense the first. Ger-
many adopted the GmbH in 1892, and the British PLC dates from 1907. Si-
milar forms had been discussed and even introduced even earlier elsewhere 
24. Gómez de la Serna (1878), pp. 29 ff.
25. Bernal (2004), p. 77, shows, based on Madoz (1850)’s Diccionario Geográfico Es-
tadístico Histórico as well as the Anuarios Estadísticos de España, that the 1829 code led to the 
creation of  about forty corporations.
26. Tortella (1968), pp. 69-84; Prados de la Escosura (1988); Erro (1995); García López 
(1994).
27. Gaceta de Madrid (1869).
28. On numerus clausus, see Hansmann and Kraakman (2002), pp.373-420.
29. The 1885 Spanish code also differed from developments elsewhere in that it kept cor-
porations in the business code; it did not “decode”, as took place in France or Germany.
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and the idea of  a PLLC-like form was debated in Spain during the years af-
ter 1885.30
Spaniards advocating a PLLC after 1885 stressed the importance of  flex-
ibility in organizing multi-owner firms. The SRL’s backers thought the 1885 
code was sufficiently flexible that adding a new form would work well, but 
they wanted explicit definition of  the new form to create certainty about how 
it would be used. Opponents of  a new form thought the 1885 code offered the 
corporation itself  enough flexibility that it could be used as written for small 
companies and family enterprises, so no new form was needed.31 One impor-
tant issue concerned the possible confusion of  the SRL with the partnership. 
This possibility was acute, since all expected that most SRLs would be small 
firms. Reflecting and guiding this debate were two well worked-out proposals 
offered in the second decade of  the 20th century.32
In 1919, the Ministry of  Justice issued a regulation for all commercial reg-
istries that short-circuited this discussion. The regulation’s §108 stated that 
the SRL was distinct from the standard legal forms described in the Commer-
cial Code’s §122, so commercial registries were instructed to enroll firms or-
ganized as SRLs. Below we document an almost immediate reaction to the 
new possibility.33 In 1926, Spain established a commission charged with draft-
ing a new commercial code. The commission discussed, among other issues, 
specific rules about SRLs such as minimum capital, voting rules, etc.34 As the 
1926 project never came to fruition, the rules governing the creation of  SRLs 
remained those of  the 1885 code’s default rules on partnerships until 1953, 
when Spain passed its first legislation governing its PLLC. In issuing regula-
tions in 1919, the Ministry did not anticipate that Spain would wait so long 
to adopt formal law governing the SRL.
Table 1 summarizes the legal forms of  enterprise available to Spanish en-
trepreneurs in our period. The comparator countries, France, German, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, constituted four of  the largest and 
most industrial economies of  the time. The project from which this table is 
adapted stresses that while France and Germany were civil-law countries, and 
the United Kingdom and the United States were common-law countries, nei-
ther “within” nor “between” comparisons provide much comfort for the LLSV 
stress on civil vs. common law in driving the legal foundations of  economic 
life. The law of enterprise form differed considerably between France and 
Germany on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and the United States 
on the other. France and the United Kingdom had relatively flexible corpo-
30. Diario de las Sesiones de las Cortes (24.01.1883); Prieto (1968), pp. 215-245.
31. Ruiz (1919) provides a summary of  the positions for and against. 
32. Roig i Bergadá (1923 [1930]).
33. Gaceta de Madrid (1919a), p. 1018.
34. Lasso (1999), p. 399 and ff.
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TAbLe 1 ▪ The Menu of Organizational Choices: Industrial Countries vs. Spain
form Deﬁnition of form
Availability -  
Western Countries Availability - Spain
Ordinary partnership Two or more 
partners, all
unlimitedly liable
France: yes
Germany: yes
UK: yes
US: yes
Yes
Limited partnership One or more general 
partners
with unlimited liability, 
and
one or more special
partners who cannot
participate in 
management
but who have limited
liability
France: yes
Germany: yes
UK: only after 1907
US: yes, but in an
unattractive form
Yes
Limited partnership
with tradable
shares
Same as limited 
partnership,
except special 
partners’
shares can be bought 
and sold on the 
market
France: yes
Germany: yes
UK: no
US: no
Yes, but reference in 
code is indirect, and 
it was not widely 
used
Corporation All members have 
limited
liability and their 
shares are
tradable
Required special
permission until:
France: 1867
Germany: 1860s–
1870,
varied by state
UK: 1844 without
limited liability and
1855–56 with limited
liability
US: mostly middle 
third of nineteenth 
century, varied by 
state
General incorporation 
from 1829 Code to 
1847. General 
incorporation 
re-introduced in 1869 
and affirmed the 
1885 Code 
Private limited
liability
company
All members have 
limited
liability but their 
shares are
not tradable
France: 1925
Germany: 1892
UK: 1907
US: 1870s–1880s for 
a few states, but
unattractive; laws in
1950s–1970s allowed
close corporations to
mimic; 1980s–1990s
Legally possible after 
Business Code of 
1885; specific 
regulations for 
registration 
introduced in 1919
Source: Adapted from Guinnane et al (2007), p. 59.
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ration law, while Germany and the United States placed considerable struc-
ture on the corporation. Adding Spain to this picture further undermines the 
image of  how civil-law countries differed from common-law countries. Spain 
seemed not to enforce some of  the rules it did have about enterprises. More 
specifically, Spain had general incorporation long before most other coun-
tries, and its corporations were flexible in comparison to at least one com-
mon-law country, the United States, and the SRL’s creation does not fit the 
image of  inflexible law that LLSV stress. The SRL’s creation illustrates an ap-
proach to new law that students of  the common-law have long stressed as the 
supposed unique advantage of  that legal system.35
Choice of enterprise form: evidence from two empirical sources
How did Spanish firms use all this flexibility? To answer this question we 
rely on two distinct datasets that allow us to study the choice of  enterprise 
form. As is often the case with historical data, our sources do not provide pre-
cisely what we want, but together the two sources yield a remarkable picture. 
The Appendix describes these sources in detail; here we provide a brief  over-
view. Both datasets are based on the registration of  new firms with the Com-
mercial Registry. The first source consists of  the number of  firms organized 
under each form, along with the total capital in these firms, for the period 
1886-1936. This aggregate source, which we call the Anuarios, is available an-
nually at the province level, and provides a rare complete picture of  how firms 
were organized.36 The second source, which we call Asociación, has firm-level 
information on legal form, total invested capital, and other information for 
every firm registered in Spain in the years 1925-1927. This firm-level detail is 
unfortunately available in this way only for these three years, but since the 
source pertains to a period after the SRL’s introduction, it casts considerable 
light on firm choices.
Both databases share limitations because of  the underlying source. All in-
formation about a firm pertains to the day it was registered; attributes such 
as capital stock or number of  owners could and probably did, in some cases, 
change over the firm’s life. We suspect that our capital-stock figures for cor-
porations are more questionable than for other firms for this reason. In ad-
dition, our sources do not tell us anything about a firm’s subsequent survival. 
Some firms apparently never really operated, and others probably failed fair-
ly soon after their registration. (See the Appendix for more on this issue.) For 
both partnerships and corporations, not all of  the stated capital was paid-in 
35. See Table 1 in Guinnane et al (2007), p.59.
36. Further discussion on this source has already been noted in footnotes 17 to 19.
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at the time the firm registered, although this practice was much more com-
mon with corporations.
Figure 1 uses the Anuarios to report the distribution of  firm registrations, 
by legal form, over the period available (1886-1936) for Spain as a whole. For 
the late 19th century, the ordinary partnership accounted for most new firms, 
with the limited partnership accounting for 15-20 per cent of  new firms in 
each year.37 Some 5-10 per cent of new firms organized as corporations. Start-
ing in 1898, we see an increase in the proportion of  new firms using the cor-
porate form, a change that probably reflects repatriation of  capital after the 
loss of  Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines in 1898.38 The SRL’s appear-
ance in 1920 did not arrest the growing proportion of  firms organized as cor-
porations, but led to immediate, dramatic reductions in the use of  both the 
ordinary and the limited partnerships. The SRL was a closer substitute for 
the partnership forms than for the corporation. Entrepreneurs organizing small 
and medium-sized firms welcomed the chance to adopt limited-liability and 
locked-in capital without taking on all the requirements of the corporate form. 
By 1926, limited partnerships had become rare, and the ordinary partnership 
accounted for about fifteen per cent of  new firms.39
Figure 1 implicitly gives a tiny partnership the same weight as a large cor-
poration. Figure 2 reports the allocation of  capital invested across the differ-
ent enterprise forms. Here we see that corporations usually account for at least 
sixty per cent of  all capital invested in new firms in a given year, and that in 
the 20th century this proportion was even larger. When introduced, the typi-
cal SRL remained small, accounting for much less of  total capital than in 
numbers. Comparing Figures 1 and 2 highlights an important fact to be borne 
in mind with all these comparisons: most corporations were huge compared 
to firms organized in other ways. 
Figure 3 documents the overwhelming weight of  Barcelona and Madrid 
in Spanish commercial life, especially for corporations. The figure reports the 
total number of  corporations registered in Spain, as well as the same figures 
for Barcelona and Madrid. We include an estimate of GNP per capita to show 
that incomes are rising throughout this period, and that company formation 
is not closely correlated with changes in GNP. Between them, Barcelona and 
Madrid often account for more than half  of  all new Spanish corporations. 
This dominance does not extend to other legal forms; it is peculiar to the cor-
poration. Figure 4 shows capital invested in corporations, and not numbers 
of  corporations. While Barcelona and Madrid were home to a disproportion-
37. Martín, Hernández and Garrués (1999) underscore the SCO’s persistence in Anda-
lusia.
38. Maluquer (1996), pp. 317-330.
39. Guinnane and Rosenthal (2012) show that in France, the SARL’s introduction led 
to the near-disappearance of  the limited partnership.
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figure 1 ▪ Number of firms, by type
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figure 2 ▪ Distribution of capital by legal form
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ate share of  all corporations, those firms were not always the largest corpo-
rations in Spain. In 1900, for example, the averag e corporation registered in 
Barcelona had an authorized capital of  885 thousand pesetas, and in Madrid 
in that year, 784 thousand pesetas. On the other hand, the three corporations 
registered in Seville in 1900 had an average capital of  more than 4 million pe-
setas.
The reasons for these two provinces’ role for corporations are not hard to 
find. As the national capital, Madrid was the logical headquarters for firms that 
had, or aimed to have a national, reach. Barcelona played a similar role for 
Catalonia, a relatively heavily-industrialized part of Spain. Barcelona and Ma-
drid also account for a large share of all new limited partnerships and SRLs, 
but nothing like their domination for corporations. This is as we expect: small-
er firms worked in a more local environment, and had little reason to be far 
from customers or owners. In any case, the importance of  Barcelona and Ma-
drid require caution in all that follows.
figure 3 ▪ Number of new corporations in Barcelona, Madrid, and Spain as a whole
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Regional variation
Another way to examine this information takes advantage of  the provin-
cial detail in the Anuarios. Maps 1-3 present the geographical distribution of 
new firms across Spain for years corresponding to a population census. The 
geographical distribution of  enterprise forms implies some clues about how 
and why firms chose a particular enterprise form. An enterprise form found 
nearly everywhere probably suits the needs of  small firms that every local 
economy needs, does not require complementary institutions such as a stock 
market, and does not exceed the abilities of  local lawyers and notaries. An en-
terprise form found only in a few places, on the other hand, must be one that 
is only suited to particular business types, and that may not be possible with-
out a stock market or more advanced notarial expertise.
Maps 1 and 2 show the number of firms registered, per 100 thousand peo-
ple in a province. (Note the difference in the legends for Maps 1 and 2). Map 
3 reports the total capital invested for SRLs and corporations in a given year, 
figure 4 ▪ Capital invested in new corporations, Barcelona, Madrid, and Spain as a 
whole
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MAP 1 ▪ Number of partnerships and limited partnerships per 100 thousand
MAP 2 ▪ Number of corporations and SRL 100 thousand
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divided by the province’s population. Map 1 shows the contrast between the 
ordinary and limited partnerships. We already know that at the national lev-
el, many more firms preferred the ordinary to the limited partnership. The 
map shows that the limited partnership’s use was heavily concentrated in Bar-
celona and Madrid, and outside these provinces to centers limited to a few 
commercial centers. Fewer firms established corporations, but the corpora-
tions that did come into being were found in most of  Spain’s provinces. 
The decline in corporations from 1920 to 1930 has a geographical pattern 
similar to the decrease for ordinary partnerships, reflecting the general reduc-
tion in new companies in the last years of  that decade. The SRL, on the oth-
er hand, was concentrated at first in a few provinces; fifty per cent of  Span-
ish provinces in 1920 saw no new SRLs at all, and fully one-quarter of  them 
were in Barcelona. The SRL found favor in areas with different economies, 
however; the Basque Country (most notably Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa) regis-
tered a total of  49 firms (out of  213) in 1920. By 1930, the SRL had increased 
its geographic spread to include more provinces, but Barcelona still account-
ed for a large proportion (50 out of  348 firms). The SRL’s rise between 1920 
and 1930 does not correspond precisely to the reduction in either limited part-
nerships or corporations, suggesting that whatever substitution was taking 
place did not occur strictly along geographic lines. Map 3, finally, shows the 
reduction in capital invested in new corporations and SRLs in Spain between 
MAP 3 ▪ Total capital invested for SRLs and corporations, per capita
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1920 and 1930. The diminution in capital invested in corporations affected 
nearly the entire country. For SRLs the contraction was similarly broadly 
based, and by 1930 capital invested in new SRLs was negligible in all but a 
few provinces.
Table 2 explores an important feature of the geographic variation shown 
in the maps, which is the degree to which firms of different types were concen-
trated in a few Spanish provinces. Concentration in this sense can be summa-
rized with several different indices, most notably the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index. Here we rely on two simpler indices, which are the proportion of firms 
(or capital) accounted for by the three (or ten) most important Spanish prov-
inces. We limit ourselves to the four years that correspond to a Spanish popu-
lation census, so we can compute accurate per-capita measures. Note first the 
TAbLe 2 ▪ Concentration of Spanish firms
Numbers of firms firms/1000 people
Capital/1000 
people
Year
Number of 
zeros PC3 PC10 PC3 PC10 PC3 PC10
Partnership
1887 4 0,49 0,72 0,28 0,60 0,46 0,78
1910 2 0,43 0,68 0,33 0,56 0,38 0,68
1920 2 0,44 0,70 0,28 0,56 0,46 0,72
1930 9 0,53 0,72 0,30 0,57 0,31 0,68
Limited 
Partnership
1887 16 0,56 0,77 0,36 0,68 0,53 0,85
1910 17 0,53 0,78 0,35 0,68 0,54 0,85
1920 11 0,53 0,76 0,34 0,63 0,41 0,73
1930 37 0,66 0,94 0,51 0,94 0,58 0,98
Corporation
1887 28 0,49 0,78 0,34 0,75 0,76 0,98
1910 9 0,43 0,66 0,32 0,60 0,54 0,90
1920 5 0,58 0,75 0,37 0,63 0,44 0,89
1930 11 0,65 0,83 0,39 0,67 0,56 0,84
SRL
1920 30 0,55 0,90 0,48 0,88 0,74 0,95
1930 14 0,57 0,83 0,48 0,76 0,57 0,84
Source: For firms, Dirección General de los Registros Civil y del Notariado (1901; 1911; 1909 to 1936); for 
population, Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
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number of provinces with no firms of a given type. Not surprisingly, nearly all 
provinces see at least a few ordinary partnerships registered in each year. Also 
not surprisingly, many provinces did not see any corporations until the corpo-
rate boom of the late 19th century. The limited partnership was more uncom-
mon, not appearing in a substantial number of provinces. In 1930, it becomes 
even rarer, which reflects the way it was driven out by the SRL, as noted ear-
lier. Finally, when the SRL was first introduced, it was limited to a small number 
of provinces, but by 1930 it had spread to be more common than the limited 
partnership and almost as common as the ordinary partnership.
We present the two concentration indices in three different ways: the num-
ber of firms of a given type; the number of firms per thousand people; and 
the total registered capital per thousand people. Normalization by population 
reduces apparent concentration considerably, which just reflects the fact that 
some Spanish provinces had many more people than others. (In 1910, the most 
populous province, Barcelona, had 1.14 million inhabitants, while the next 
two, Valencia and Madrid, each had roughly 880 thousand. Several provinces, 
on the other hand, had fewer than 250 thousand persons, and Alava had only 
97 thousand.) One would expect a province with more people to have more 
firms. Several patterns stand out in this table. Focusing on the proportions 
per capita in the ten most important provinces, we see essentially the reverse 
of  the “zeros” discussed above. The SRL was at first highly concentrated, but 
this declines considerably from 1920 to 1930. Limited partnerships became 
more concentrated in a few provinces, and the ordinary partnership was the 
least concentrated. But even the ordinary partnership suggests the importance 
of  a few places: ten provinces, roughly one-fifth of  the total, accounted for 
over half  of  all ordinary partnerships, whether we normalized by population 
or not.
Capital invested in firms was even more concentrated, suggesting that the 
places with relatively many firms also had the larger firms. Even in 1930, after 
some decline, the ten most important provinces account for 90 percent of all 
corporate capital. Capital invested in limited partnerships behaves similarly; the 
largest were concentrated in a few places. The SRL started out highly concen-
trated by capital, but rapidly declined. Concentration of specific firm types 
could reflect either features of the local environment or the nature of the local 
economies, as noted.40 On the other hand, the geographic patterns we observe 
would reflect local economic opportunities and the firm type best suited to their 
exploitation. For example, in a mining region we would not be surprised to see 
relatively many corporations, as was the case in Murcia and Asturias.41
40. Paz-Ares (1997), p. 176.
41. We defer econometric analysis to future work. But we did check for spatial correla-
tion in the distribution of firms of each type (both counts of firms and counts per 100 thousand 
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Choices at the firm level
Our second database, the Asociación source, contains firm-level informa-
tion on some 3200 firms registered in the years 1925-1927 only.42 For each firm, 
we know the enterprise’s name, the province in which it registered, its nominal 
capital, and the firm’s intended duration as stated in its articles of association. 
The source also reports the line of business the firm intended to pursue, which 
we have classified using the standard CNAE 2009 scheme.43 Table 3 allocates 
our firms to these sectors. Table 3 suggests a strong association between sec-
tor and legal form (the X2 test for independence has a p-value of zero), but at 
the same time shows that with the exception of the limited partnership, each 
legal form was found in nearly all sectors. Hesitation about the SRL’s appro-
priateness for banking and insurance probably accounts for the small number 
of  firms in these sectors. The corporation was most common in some sectors 
that required large, sunk investments, such as mining, energy, and water and 
sanitation. This prevalence probably reflects the problem of making this type 
of  investment under the threat of  untimely dissolution. Partnerships were 
most common among firms that had lower capital requirements, and for 
which the advantages of  a guaranteed lifespan do not offset the problems of 
minority oppression. The SRL, for its part, had a broad representation across 
nearly all sectors.
Figure 5 reports the density of  stated capital by legal form for all firms 
and for firms in a selected group of  sectors. The figure uses the (natural) log 
of  capital to make the graphs easier to interpret; the difference between “10” 
and “15” is thus not five pesetas, but 3.2 million pesetas. We focus on the sec-
tors “manufacturing,” “trade,” and “transportation” in part because they 
have the largest numbers of firms, but also because Table 3 demonstrated con-
siderable differences in the forms used in these sectors.44 The distribution of 
firm sizes measured in this way is remarkably similar across industrial sectors. 
Corporations were much larger than other firms. And ordinary partnerships 
were relatively more numerous among smaller firms. But with the exception 
of  the transportation sector, there is relatively little difference between limit-
ed partnerships and SRLs, and the shapes and relative placement of  the dis-
tributions is similar across sectors. This suggests that the SRL’s advantages 
people). Neither the Moran I nor the Geary’s C statistics suggest significant correlations of 
this type in any of  the four years represented on the maps.
42. The source also includes information on 70 enterprises that were organized under 
the civil law. We exclude them from our analysis.
43. If  a firm lists more than one business activity, we classify it according to the first. 
CNAE 2009: Clasificación Nacional de Actividades Económicas 2009. http://www.ine.es 
[13.08.2013].
44. The figures report densities of  the capital distribution, which can be interpreted as 
the probability that a firm of a given type has a capital of  the given quantity. 
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included its ability to offer a corporation’s advantages with a more flexible in-
ternal structure.
Table 4, finally, addresses the question of  time limits on the firm written 
into the articles of  association. The articles could either limit the firm’s exist-
ence to a specific time period, or leave the issue open. We must stress that 
partnerships were effectively at-will, so for them, this time limitation was an 
upper bound and not necessarily binding. Several regularities stand out. First, 
only about thirty per cent of  corporations limited the firm’s existence, far less 
than for the other forms. Corporations that did adopt a time limit tended to 
make it a long time, with a median of  twenty years and one-quarter of  firms 
using a time limit of  fifty or more years. The SRL and the partnerships tend-
ed to adopt much shorter-lived contracts. One interesting difference is that 
SRLs were more likely than partnerships to make their contracts open-end-
ed, perhaps a suggestion that firms were using this form for purposes more 
TAbLe 3 ▪ Distribution of legal form by sector
Percentage of firms in this sector that are: 
Sector Partnership
Limited 
partnership
Corporation SrL
Number 
of firms
Agriculture 10.5 5.3 50.0 34.2 38
Mining 15.8 4.9 65.8 13.4 82
Factories 37.8 6.6 30.9 24.6 1,230
Energy 20.4 2.1 67.7 9.7 93
Water and sanitation 11.1 3.7 74.1 11.1 27
Building 31.4 2.5 43.0 23.1 121
Trade 42.8 7.5 21.2 28.5 1,081
Transportation 38.0 5.3 36.0 20.7 150
Hotel and restaurants 32.6 2.0 32.6 32.6 49
Media 4.8 6.4 67.7 21.0 62
Finance and insurance 32.7 1.9 61.5 3.85 52
Real estate 22.2 0 63.9 13.9 36
Professional 15.9 1.6 46.0 36.5 63
Rents_Offices_Travel 20.0 0 26.7 53.3 15
Public administration 70.0 0 20.0 10.0 10
Health 9.1 0 54.6 36.4 11
Leisure and arts 20.0 0 40.0 40.0 25
Other 40.0 0 36.7 23.3 30
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo, Comercio e Industria (1927; 1928a; 1928b)
Note: Sectors are defined as in the CNAE (2009)
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figure 5 ▪ Size of Spanish firms by legal form
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TAbLe 4 ▪ Duration limits for firms
Percentage of firms that limit firm’s duration by contract:
Legal form Percentage
Partnership 52
Limited partnership 55
Corporation 31
SRL 45
All firms 43
Contractual duration (in years) for firms that state a limit:
Legal form Median 25th percentile 75th percentile Number of firms
Partnership 6 5 10 553
Limited partnership 8 5 10 100
Corporation 20 10 50 297
SRL 6 5 10 334
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo, Comercio e Industria (1927; 1928a; 1928b)
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nearly like those suited to a corporation. This emphasizes the fact that one 
reason to adopt an SRL rather than partnership was the SRL’s ability to con-
tend with problems of  untimely dissolution.
Conclusion
Our account of the development of Spanish company law in the 19th and 
early 20th century stressed its long tradition of flexibility, as well as the intro-
duction of a completely new form, the SRL, in 1919. Using two related empir-
ical sources, we have documented the choice of legal forms entrepreneurs made 
within this system. Spanish enterprise law was flexible in two important ways. 
First, the law itself  imposed relatively few restrictions, on the corporation espe-
cially, and we can document that some important restrictions were simply ig-
nored. Second, by abandoning the principle of numerus clausus for enterprise 
forms, Spanish law allowed firms to organize however they wished. The most 
remarkable feature of this aspect of Spanish legal history is the creation, out-
side of any parliamentary sanction, of the SRL in 1919. Spain’s interest in and 
use of the SRL clearly reflects the experience of countries like Germany and the 
United Kingdom with similar enterprise forms. But the way the SRL came to 
be reflects a process thought more typical of common-law countries, and (fur-
ther) undermines the central notion of common-law flexibility and civil-law in-
flexibility that underlies the influential “law and finance” research program. 
Our empirical findings show how Spanish firms used all this flexibility. 
First, the corporation was more common in Spain than in some other civil-
law jurisdictions such as France or Germany. This ubiquity may reflect the 
flexibility of  the Spanish corporation, and the opportunities it afforded en-
trepreneurs to adapt the form to their own needs. Second, the introduction 
of  the SRL nearly wiped out the limited partnership and made the ordinary 
partnership uncommon, a pattern we see after the PLLC’s introduction in 
France but not in Germany. 
At the outset, we noted that a long tradition in Spanish economic histo-
riography blames slow growth on rigid institutions that did not allow Span-
ish people to take advantage of  opportunities created by changing technolo-
gies and other features of  the late 19th and 20thcenturies. This theme dovetails 
with LLSV’s core idea that the civil-law tradition, by limiting legal change to 
new law or codes enacted by parliaments, makes it too easy for a small group 
to protect their interests at the expense of  improved opportunities for the 
many. Our story of  Spanish legal flexibility ultimately raises a question: in 
this domain, rigidity was not a problem. We must look elsewhere to under-
stand Spain’s long economic stagnation.
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Appendix: sources
This appendix provides more detail on the two datasets employed in the pa-
per. Starting in 1886, Spain maintained an exhaustive register of companies ap-
pearing in each province’s commercial register. The files reflect the information 
provided by the firms as they register the creation of new firms. Each new en-
tity was assigned a number, which it retained for the life of the firm. The law 
required that changes in the articles of association also be registered, along with 
the firm’s merger, transformation, or dissolution. We do not use the reported 
information on firm changes or death because there is good reason to doubt its 
completeness. Many firms wrote a time limit into their articles of association, 
as we showed, and if  the firm ceased operation when originally planned, there 
was no requirement to report that fact to the registry.45 Some owners of defunct 
firms had to report, since changes to the commercial registry freed them of li-
ability associated with the dead firm. But the law imposed no real penalty for 
failure to register the end of a firm’s operations, so if  owners had no incentive 
to report, that fact could go unreported.46
We constructed our own Anuarios database following the approach taken 
by Tafunell. The underlying source is the annual, official publication: Anuarios 
de la Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado which appeared under 
various titles during our period: Estadística del Registro Mercantil (1886-1898), 
Estadística del RegistroMercantil (1899–1909), and Anuario de los Registros y 
del Notariado. This last publication started in 1911 and continues to the present. 
These three references each list, at the province level, the number of firms 
registered by legal form and total capital. The sources also divide firms by ba-
sic function: for example, which are banks, which have some type of conces-
sion, which are mines, etc. This source has strengths and weaknesses. We high-
light two problems. First, the capital figures are always authorized (not paid-in) 
capital, so they probably reflect an over-estimate for corporations especially. 
Second, in some cases when a firm registered a branch offer, the registry listed 
that branch’s capital as the capital for the entire firm, leading to double-count-
ing at the national level and over-estimates for the province where the branch 
was located.
Anuarios Estadísticos de España
The publication of  Spain’s Annual Statistics bulletins commenced at the 
beginning of  the 19th century. Starting in 1912, the Bulletin was published al-
45. § 38 Reglamento del Registro Mercantil, 1885; §112 Reglamento del Registro Mercan-
til, 1919.
46. Tafunell (2005), p. 715-716 discusses the completeness of the “death” registrations.
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most annually. We use the Anuario Estadístico de España for the period 1912 
to 1936. The outbreak of  civil war prevented publication of  the 1935 issue. 
Annual publication did not resume until 1943, after our period. This publi-
cation is the source for the total number of  corporations used in Appendix 
Table A.1. The Anuario Estadístico de España is also the source for the pop-
ulation data used in the maps, but we rely on an electronic version, “Series 
Históricas de Población” by the Spanish Statistical Office.
La Asociación Mercantil en España
The second collection is based on an unusual source that unfortunately 
was only constructed for three years. Starting in 1927, the Special Statistics 
Section of  the General Directorate of  Commerce, Industry and Services pub-
lished La Asociación Mercantil en España, a nominative list of  all the compa-
nies registered by the Commercial Register. Apparently, this publication was 
to be maintained indefinitely, but it appeared only for the years 1926, 1927 
and 1928. The publication contains three types of  information regarding 
commercial companies that (1) registered/constituted; (2) dissolved; and (3) 
modified. We focus on the first, for the same reasons discussed above. 
Stocks versus flows in the Anuarios
One limitation of the source is that it reports the registration of new firms 
and does not include any information about whether the firm actually started 
operations or how long it lasted. Thus it is a particular type of “flow” data. To 
cross-check this source, we would like to compare this flow information to the 
stocks of firms operating at a given time, but the first opportunity to do some 
comes rather late and in any case only reports the number of corporations. 
Nonetheless, it is worth looking to see how the two reports compare. Because 
we do not know how long firms operated, we do not know which set of regis-
trations to compare to the stock of firms at a given time. That is, some of the 
firms operating in 1925 (for example) were first registered in 1924, while oth-
ers are much older, and we do not know the complete “life table” for firm 
mortality. The best we can do is to construct several comparisons and see how 
they compare.
Table A.1 reports four such measures, by province. In each case, the de-
nominator of  the ratio is the number of  corporations operating in 1925, a 
stock. The numerator consists of  the total number of  corporations registered 
in various timespans (a flow). The first uses all corporations registered in the 
period 1900-1924; the second, 1910-1924; the third, 1920-1924; and the last, 
simply the number of  corporations registered in the single year of  1924. The 
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ratios imply that at least some corporations lived short lives. The mean of 
the first measure for all of  Spain is 3.27, implying that three times as many 
corporations were registered from 1900-1924 as still operated in 1925. The 
ratios vary across provinces to a surprising degree; in Murcia, there were 6.25 
corporations created in 1900-1924 for every corporation operating in 1925, 
while in Vizcaya the ratio was about 1.5. The different definitions yield dif-
ferent results in the way expected, and are highly correlated (the correlation 
between the first columns is 0.9, for example, and the lowest correlation, be-
tween the first and fourth measure, is still 0.48). Because the ratios are lower 
in Barcelona and Madrid than in other provinces, the weighted means of 
these measures for Spain are considerably smaller than the unweighted means. 
The weighted mean of  the first ratio is 2.11, for example (where the weights 
are the number of  corporations operating in 1925).
TAbLe A.1 ▪ Comparing corporation registrations to stocks of corporations in 1925
Number of corporations registered in this period/
number of corporations extant in 1925
Province 1900-24 1910-24 1920-24 1924
Alava 2.91 1.68 1.00 0.36
Albacete 2.20 1.80 0.53 0.00
Alicante 4.91 3.69 0.86 0.11
Almería 5.25 3.00 0.95 0.25
Ávila 1.60 1.40 0.60 0.40
Badajoz 4.27 3.18 0.91 0.00
Baleares 2.00 1.53 0.67 0.07
Barcelona 1.54 1.42 0.53 0.10
Burgos 1.95 1.35 0.50 0.20
Cáceres 1.82 1.00 0.53 0.06
Cádiz 2.73 2.00 0.56 0.07
Canarias 5.25 3.42 2.21 0.13
Castellón 3.61 3.06 1.39 0.33
Ciudad Real 2.55 1.55 0.32 0.06
Córdoba 2.89 1.93 0.74 0.07
Coruña 3.84 2.48 0.52 0.04
Cuenca 2.25 1.50 0.50 0.25
Gerona 3.27 2.79 1.09 0.09
Granada 3.97 2.89 0.81 0.14
Guadalajara 3.33 2.67 1.17 0.33
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Guipúzcoa 3.09 2.45 1.06 0.18
Huelva 3.86 2.93 1.36 0.36
Huesca 3.38 2.38 1.31 0.46
Jaén 4.70 2.19 0.70 0.08
León 2.73 1.73 1.18 0.18
Lérida 3.79 3.47 1.21 0.16
Logroño 5.09 4.36 1.64 0.09
Lugo 2.67 1.89 0.89 0.00
Madrid 1.88 1.45 0.60 0.11
Málaga 4.95 4.03 1.28 0.05
Murcia 6.26 3.26 0.91 0.09
Navarra 3.06 2.16 0.94 0.14
Orense 3.57 2.43 1.14 0.00
Oviedo 2.17 1.27 0.48 0.08
Palencia 9.00 5.67 2.67 1.00
Pontevedra 3.71 2.43 1.29 0.14
Salamanca 3.09 2.55 1.09 0.27
Santander 2.51 1.73 0.34 0.01
Segovia 2.13 1.50 0.38 0.00
Sevilla 3.26 2.62 1.08 0.21
Soria 3.50 1.75 0.25 0.00
Tarragona 2.41 2.09 1.09 0.18
Teruel 3.22 1.78 1.11 0.22
Toledo 3.64 3.09 1.73 0.18
Valencia 2.24 1.93 0.59 0.06
Valladolid 2.75 1.95 0.55 0.15
Vizcaya 1.50 0.85 0.32 0.05
Zamora 2.11 1.78 0.67 0.11
Zaragoza 1.82 1.05 0.35 0.02
Source: See appendix text
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■
Flexibility in Spanish Company Law, 1885-1936
aBstRaCt
The Spanish business code allowed firms two types of  organizational flexibility in the late 
19th and early 20th century. Firms enjoyed great leeway in adapting rules to their needs. The 
corporation was especially flexible in this way. Spanish law also allowed firms to in effect crea-
te their own legal form. Until 1920, firms faced the choices typical of  civil-law countries, na-
mely, the corporation, and the ordinary or limited partnership. But the Spanish business code 
was explicitly “open,” allowing firms to do something else if  they wished. This second type of 
flexibility reached its zenith in the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada (SRL), a form simi-
lar to Germany’s GmbH or Britain’s PLC. For its first decades the SRL was a creation of  no-
taries and entrepreneurs, and was not written into Spanish law until 1953. This paper descri-
bes the law governing formation of Spanish companies, and documents the choices firms used.
key WoRds: limited liability, business code, commercial registry, Spain
Jel Codes: K22, N40, N80, O57
■
La flexibilidad en la Ley de Sociedades Anónimas española, 1885-1936
Resumen
El Código de Comercio español permitió que las sociedades mercantiles gozaran de una 
elevada flexibilidad hasta comienzos del xx. Empleamos dos conceptos de flexibilidad. En pri-
mer lugar, las firmas poseían un amplio margen para adaptar las reglas a sus necesidades. La 
sociedad anónima disfrutó especialmente de dicha flexibilidad. En segundo lugar, la legisla-
ción permitía crear un tipo nuevo de sociedad a partir de las definidas en el código —sociedad 
anónima, sociedad comanditaria y sociedad colectiva—. Gracias al carácter abierto del códi-
go se introdujo la Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada (SRL), una figura semejante a la 
GmbH alemana o la PLC británica. Hasta 1953 la SRL careció de ley propia y sus caracterís-
ticas estaban definidas por la práctica de los notarios y las demandas de los emprendedores. 
En este artículo analizamos la legislación societaria española y las decisiones de los empresa-
rios a la hora de decantarse por una forma mercantil determinada.
PalaBRas Clave: responsabilidad limitada, código de comercio, registro mercantil, España 
CódiGos Jel: K22, N40, N80, O57
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